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This paper examines the e⁄ect of improved transparency in the bidder quali￿cation process,
using the experience based on a case study of municipal public work auctions. It reveals that
improved transparency reduces procurement cost by a maximum of three percent. This ￿nding
is robust to the concerns of endogeneity, sample selectivity, and distributional assumptions. The
bidding-function estimates, combined with features of Japanese procurement system, imply that
the improved transparency limits abuse of auctioneer￿ s discretion, and thus weakens the stability
of collusion among bidders.
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1 Introduction
Public procurement is notorious for the levels of corruption attained by dishonest public o¢ cials.
A mounting body of evidence reported across the world indicates that opaque and discretionary
procurement procedures often engender the relationship between government o¢ cials and contrac-
tors and result in enforcing collusion among contractors (Stapenhurst and Kpubdeh, 1999). It is
often recommended that the introduction of transparency in procurement procedure be an e⁄ective
method to curb corruption and restore e¢ ciency in state purchasing. Nevertheless, the penetration
of transparent practices in public procurement has been quite limited throughout the world. Indeed,
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1while the WTO has been successful in reaching a transparency agreement on the transaction of
goods and services, it has encountered di¢ culties in extending the agreement to state purchasing.1
The question that arises is whether the implementation of transparency in public procurement is
actually bene￿cial to countries. Empirical research that measures the e⁄ect of improved trans-
parency in procurement practices, however, remains scarce. The dearth of the empirical research
is mainly due to that many procurement auctions tend to operate under a given set of rules and
fail to experiment with alternative designs. This paper aims to conduct such empirical research by
using the unique experience of municipal small-scale public-works auctions in Japan.
The central government and a majority of the local governments in Japan have been using
opaque and discretionary practices while qualifying suppliers for bidding for small-scaled public-
works projects. The practice is discretionary in that, for each bid letting, procuring o¢ cials use
their discretion to decide which suppliers are quali￿ed to submit bids. It is opaque in that the
o¢ cials are not accountable for the reasons why particular suppliers are quali￿ed for the bidding.2
While the direct e⁄ect of this conventional practice is to alleviate competition by limiting the
number of quali￿ed bidders, it also breeds corruption; this is a real possibility when the o¢ cials
qualify a supplier only when the supplier o⁄ers pecuniary incentives or well-paid private sector
employment after retirement. In turn, the corruption could engender collusion in an attempt to
avoid bribe competition among suppliers. The discretionary practice could also help in disciplining
the collusion, when the o¢ cials, on behalf of the ring, punish deviators by not qualifying them.
This paper uses public-works bidding data from the local government of Mie Prefecture in Japan.
During our study period, the Mie government replaced the opaque and discretionary procedure with
a transparent and rule-based one in order to qualify bidders. In the new procedure, suppliers are
allowed to bid as long as they satisfy the minimum ￿nancial and technical requirements speci￿ed by
the government. Thus, there is no scope for procuring o¢ cials to exercise their discretion. 3 The
new practice substantially reduces the incentive for suppliers to bribe o¢ cials and thus weakens
the collusion mechanism.
Through an analysis of supplier￿ s bidding patterns, this paper examines the extent to which
the improved transparency reduces government expenditure. It reveals that suppliers bid more
aggressively under a transparent practice than under a discretionary one. The impact of the
improved transparency on winning bids is greater at the upper quantiles of the distribution of
bids than at the lower quantiles. The paper concludes that the improved transparency saved the
1The 2003 meeting of the WTO Ministers in Cancun failed to deliver a consensus, and the WTO Council decided
in July 2004 at Geneva that these issues were not prepared for negotiation.
2We use the terms ￿discretionary￿and ￿opaque￿interchangeably to describe the conventional procurement pro-
cedure.
3We use the terms ￿transparent￿and ￿rule-based￿interchangeably to describe the new procedure.
2Mie government a maximum of three percent of their annual procurement expenditure. This is
equivalent to annual cost savings of only 50 million JPY, or below half a million USD.
Why does the introduction of transparency in procurement practices result in a marginal amount
of saving in government expenditure? Based on our analysis of residuals obtained from the esti-
mated bidding function, we conjecture that this is because collusion continues to exist even under
the new procurement regime. The presence of collusion is not surprising; the Mie government insti-
tutes a system similar to that of exclusive territories and protects local suppliers against the entry
of suppliers from outside the jurisdiction. This system facilitates repeated interaction among local
suppliers without the fear of new entrants and breeds conspiratory practices. Indeed, it has been
known that bid rigging ￿ Dango for Japanese word ￿ is widespread in awarding public-works
projects in Japan (McMillan, 1991; Woodall, 1996). The analysis of the residuals also indicates
that the improved transparency weakens the stability of the collusion. This ￿nding is consistent
with and suggestive of the existence of corruption: The procuring o¢ cials, who are being bribed
by the ring members, use their discretionary power to punish deviators on behalf of the ring. Since
suppliers cannot participate in the bidding without being quali￿ed by the o¢ cials, the latter use
their discretionary powers to e⁄ectively facilitate the ring￿ s activities.
To our knowledge, this paper is the ￿rst work that empirically con￿rms theoretical implication
as to the e⁄ect of corruption on competition in auctions. Compte et al (2005) and Lambert-
Mogiliansky and Sonin (2006) show independently that collusion may emerge in equilibrium in
auctions conducted by a corrupt auctioneer. In their model, the auctioneer has discretion to
secretly allow ￿rms to readjust their bids prior to the o¢ cial opening. Self-interested abuse of
this discretion to extract rents (i.e., corruption) provides a mechanism to enforce collusion. The
theoretical implication remains the same in our application where auctioneer￿ s discretion is to allow
￿rms to submit bids. We extend their intuition to a collusive environment under Mie￿ s ￿exclusive
territory￿system and claim that the e⁄ect of improved transparency (and thus less abuse of self-
interested discretion) is to force the ring to lower its price; otherwise, the collusion would collapse
because of deviators who lower their price to seek short-term pro￿t. Our empirical analysis identi￿es
a reduction of approximately three percent of winning bids.
Empirical studies on the detection of collusion, including Porter and Zona (1993; 1999) and
Pesendorfer (2000), use evidence revealed at court cases regarding bid-rigging operations. The
market that we are studying had neither been accused of nor is under investigation for criminal
activities. However, this should not be taken as evidence against collusion and corruption. In the
past, the Fair Trade Commission in Japan (hereafter, JFTC) was characterized by lax enforcement
and weak penalties for antitrust violation against corruption and conspiratory practices, and the
3e⁄ectiveness of the implementation of the Japanese competition law has been doubtful.4 We follow
the method proposed by Porter and Zona (1993; 1999) and elaborated by Bajari and Ye (2003),
and base our inference of market competitiveness on bidding data. The evidence in this paper
suggests that collusion existed in the market, and it weakened on the introduction of transparent
practices. Although our ￿nding is a poor substitute for the evidence obtained using wiretap or the
confession by a dissident ring member, the paper provides useful insights on the manner in which
a procurement institution in￿ uences the market structure.
At this point, it is useful to clarify the meaning of the terms ￿discretion￿and ￿transparency￿
in comparison with the notion of ￿discrimination￿in the quali￿cation procedure. In the context of
this paper, the notion of discrimination implies that the government employs one or more commer-
cially irrelevant characteristics of a bidder in the quali￿cation procedure. The di⁄erence between
discretion and transparency in the quali￿cation process depends on the extent to which the quali-
fying criteria are codi￿ed and made publicly observable. Thus, discretion and discrimination refer
to di⁄erent aspects of the procurement process. In this paper, we focus on the di⁄erence between
the practices in which the quali￿cation procedure is based on codi￿ed criteria (i.e., a transparent
procedure) and in which it is based on the o¢ cial￿ s discretion such that it is not codi￿ed (i.e.,
discretionary procedure). 5
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents the features of the
local government public-works procurement that have an important bearing on our estimation
framework. This section describes the main focus of this paper ￿ the change in the procurement
procedure ￿ along with other critical features of the procurement rule. Section 3 delineates the
estimation framework employed in measuring the impact of the implementation of transparency in
public purchasing. The section also reports estimation results. Section 4 presents the conclusion.
4Miwa and Ramseyer (2005) discuss the enforcement and monitoring problems of the JFTC. Under the new
leadership of Commissioner Chairman, Kazuhiko Takeshima, the JFTC began enforcing the law. In the year of 2006,
three governors and more city mayors were arrested by independent bid-rigging scandals. Detailed evidence uncovered
during investigations shows that corrupt politicians and procurement o¢ cials arbitrated collusion in the allocation
of contracts.
5Let us clarify the di⁄erence by citing an example from another procurement practice used by the Mie government.
As discussed in the next section, the Mie government employs a system that is similar to that of exclusive territories
to protect suppliers from new entrants. Under this system, the government compels each supplier to bid and procure
only from the same district in which its headquarter is located. The exclusive territories are discriminatory such that
they introduce asymmetric treatment across bidders in terms of their locations. However, the exclusive territories
are transparent in that the rule is explicitly codi￿ed and publicly known.
42 Public Procurement Procedure in Japan
This section provides an overview of the public-works procurement system in Japan. It begins
with a description of the discretionary procurement procedure that prevails in Japanese public-
works auctions. It illustrates another element of procurement practice ￿ exclusive territories ￿
adopted by Japanese governments involved in procurement. The discretionary practice, combined
with exclusive territories, provides an ideal breeding ground for collusion and corruption. The
procurement practice described in this section will help us to formulate an empirical strategy to
analyze bidding behavior. This section also presents the summary statistics of our data set, which
has an important bearing on the estimation in the subsequent sections.
2.1 Overview of the Government Purchasing System
A government purchases a variety of goods and services. This paper focuses on the procurement
of public works, a major component of public procurement around the world. 6 In Japan, the
central and local governments are required to solicit bids and award public-works contracts to
the lowest responsible bidders under the ￿rst-price sealed-bid auction. According to statutes and
case laws, ￿responsible￿implies being ￿nancially and technically capable of executing the terms
of the contract. Many industrial countries, including Japan, specify quali￿cations of suppliers in
order to screen responsible bidders. The quali￿cations usually include criteria regarding production
performance, the number of employees in its work force, and the amount of its capitalization.
National procurement policies cover a number of objectives. While the main concern is usually
the acquisition of the required goods and services on the best possible terms, other objectives involve
promoting certain industries, protecting national securities, and favoring local suppliers through
redistribution. Japanese procurement regulations place a substantial emphasis on allocation of
resources to local suppliers. This concern creates two additional quali￿cations unique to Japan
that relax the competition among local suppliers.
The ￿rst quali￿cation resembles the practice of exclusive territories. A procuring entity in Japan
divides its jurisdiction into several districts, and compels each supplier to bid and procure only from
the same district in which the supplier￿ s headquarter is located. The Mie government in our study
divides the prefecture into eleven districts, as indicated in Figure 1. By implementing this rule, the
government successfully prevents the entry of suppliers from outside the district and procures only
from local suppliers within the district. This quali￿cation results in a loss of e¢ ciency because the
opportunity of procuring from more e¢ cient suppliers outside the prefecture￿ s jurisdiction is lost
and the intensity of competition is reduced. Furthermore, the repeated interaction among local
6As of 2002, public works accounted for 2.5 percent of the GDP in the United States, 3.3 percent in France, and
4.7 percent in Japan (OECD, 2004).
5suppliers, without the fear of new entrants, would be an ideal ground for breeding conspiratory
practices. Bid rigging, known as Dango ￿ a negotiation conducted among bidders to decide which
￿rm should be awarded the job (McMillan, 1991) ￿ is considered to be widespread in the awarding
of public works contracts. It is presumed that the exclusive territories system plays a major role
in preserving the Dango practice.
The second quali￿cation intends to provide extra protection to local suppliers, particularly
to small-scale ones. Since the actual implementation of the second quali￿cation varies among
procuring governments, we use the Mie government as an example to explain this quali￿cation.
The Mie government regulates that, for a project worth 70 million JPY (approximately half a
million USD) or less, the government should choose quali￿ed bidders at its own discretion, and
that the project should be procured by small-scale suppliers. The practice of the government
exercising its discretion is bene￿cial to the suppliers because the government is able to limit the
number of quali￿ed bidders and thus suppress bidding competition. It is presumed that the practice
also provides incentives for suppliers to bribe o¢ cials in return for their bidding quali￿cation, and
it is possible that the o¢ cials exercise their power of discretion to encourage suppliers to do so.
Furthermore, this practice can encourage suppliers to form a cartel in an attempt to relax the bribe
competition. The discretionary procedure of small-scale public works projects was abolished in mid
2002 and replaced with the existing rule-based transparent procedures that are applied to projects
worth more than 70 million JPY.
This paper studies the second quali￿cation and examines how the introduction of transparency
in procurement practices a⁄ects the bidding behavior of a project that is worth a maximum of 70
million JPY. Note that the exclusive territories system is imposed on the projects in this range.
Therefore, our empirical results regarding the e⁄ect of improved transparency depend on the exis-
tence of exclusive territories. 7 We will describe our data set in the following section.
2.2 The Data
The data used in our analysis is obtained from the Mie government. The Mie Prefecture is located in
the center of the Japanese main island (see Figure 1) with a population of less than two million. The
data contain information on all public-works projects o⁄ered for bid letting by the government from
May 2001 to March 2004. These projects include construction on rivers (14.9), ports (10.2), roads
(41.8), bridges (2.2), sewage (1.9), and erosion and torrent control works (23.8). The numbers in the
parentheses indicate the percentage of the number of public-works projects in our data. Projects are
auctioned o⁄on an average of 16 lettings per month on an irregular basis. To account for di⁄erences
7We need a structural estimation approach to analyze the e⁄ect of exclusive territories. Due to the reasons
discussed in the next section, the analysis of exclusive territories is beyond the scope of this paper.
6in project types, we include project-speci￿c dummy variables in the empirical implementation
described in Section 3. The Mie government, like other Japanese procuring entities, uses a sealed-
bid auction where a low bid is generally awarded a contract: The government rejects unreasonably
low bids, 8 and those that exceed the ceiling price, or government￿ s estimated contract price for
the project.9 The ceiling price is made public only when a winner is awarded a project. No
considerations are placed on the quality nor features of the proposed work.
This paper focuses on public-works contracts worth a maximum of 70 million JPY. A large
portion of public-works letting falls into this category, accounting for 73 percent in terms of the
number of lettings and 50 percent in terms of the value of all the lettings announced by the Mie
government during the study period. The Mie government employed the discretionary procedure
for these projects until May 2002 and later replaced it with the transparent procedure.
With regard to each public-works contract, we are aware of the identity and bid of each par-
ticipating bidder, the winner, and the characteristics of each project that was put out to in the
tender. Table 1 presents important statistics in the data classi￿ed by procurement procedure. 10
The average auction conducted under transparent practices receives 15.8 bidders, approximately
twice as many as those conducted under discretionary practices (8.9 bidders). As mentioned in the
previous subsection, in contrast to the discretionary practices under which the number of bidders
is limited to less than or equal to ￿fteen, the government did not restrict the number of bidders
under transparent practices. There were a total of 328 actual bidders (i.e., suppliers who actually
participate in the bidding) ￿ an eighth of the number of potential bidders (2680) identi￿ed by
the Mie government, which updates the list of potential bidders annually. Of the potential bid-
ders, 12 percent entered and 20.3 percent exited the market during our study period. We use the
information on potential bidders when controlling for sample selectivity in the estimation section.
Table 1 divides the information into three categories: characteristics of bidders, characteristics
of auctions, and auction outcomes. The characteristics of bidders do not di⁄er signi￿cantly between
the practices. The Mie government provided the locations of the bidders￿headquarters and each
public-works project. Figure 1 presents the spatial distribution of the locations. As noted in the
previous section, the Mie government divides the prefecture into eleven districts and enforces each
8The government excludes from participation in a procurement all suppliers that submitted tenders with prices
below the secret minimum price. This system prevents suppliers from being awarded a contact at a price that is
excessively low and may result in inferior construction work. The value of the minimum price is disclosed when the
contract is awarded. We control the existence of the minimum price on the basis of the bidder￿ s participation decision
in our empirical analysis.
9The government runs a second auction when all bids are above the engineering estimate.
10This paper focuses on solo bids and excludes bids made by joint ventures. Joint ventures are often observed for
large-scaled projects, which are not the focus of the paper. When constructing the variables of backlog and utilization
rate, we consider the bidder￿ s committed work not only from solo contracts but also from joint-venture contracts.
7bidder to bid and procure only from the same district where its headquarters are located. For
each bid, we calculate the great circle distance between the locations of the bidder￿ s headquarter
and the project site.11 The calculated distance serves as a proxy for construction cost because a
small supplier usually brings its own heavy machines to the project site from its storage located on
the premise of the headquarter.12 This variable is also used in other empirical studies on bidding
patterns, such as the studies conducted by Bajari and Ye (2003) and De Silva et al (2003).
The utilization rate is de￿ned as the supplier￿ s current job backlog divided by its capacity. The
job backlog is calculated as the total value of the projects undertaken by the ￿rm at the time of the
bidding. For each contract awarded, our data include the contract value in yen and the length of
the contract in days. We assume that each project is completed at a uniform speed over the period
of the contract. 13 We aggregate the values of the backlog of projects, including joint-venture
projects.14 Firm￿ s capacity is de￿ned as the maximum backlog carried by the ￿rm in our study
period. The calculated utilization rate of a ￿rm thus di⁄ers with time. In fact, the regression of the
utilization rate on supplier-speci￿c dummies shows that the variation between suppliers explains
merely 24 percent of the total variation of the utilization rate. Therefore, the manner in which the
utilization rate a⁄ects bids is not evident. With regard to low utilization rates, an increase in the
rate would decrease the production cost and consequently the submitted bid level. However, since
capital is ￿xed at any given time, at high utilization rates, diminishing returns to scale must begin
to occur.
In the Japanese public-works sector a system of government ratings has been established. This
system is important because the rating determines the project size for which a ￿rm is allowed to
bid. The government rating system involves a sophisticated process that takes into account the
contractor￿ s ￿nancial condition, credit line, paid-in capital, management structure, past history of
similar projects completed, and the number of engineers employed. In general, the Mie government
revised the individual rating annually during the study period. A majority of the bidders included
in our study received ratings lower than 1000, indicating that they are not large suppliers and are












12Although o¢ cial statistics are unavailable, interviews with o¢ cials in the Mie government revealed that the use
of leased machines was not popular during the study period.
13The utilization rate estimates reported in the next section are similar under the alternative assumption of no
depreciation until the end of the contract.
14While calculating the backlog of a joint-venture project, we divide the value of the joint-venture contact by the
number of ￿rms participating in the project.
8permitted to bid for public works whose worth is equal to or less than 70 million JPY. Suppliers
with ratings higher than 1000 would not usually be allowed to procure projects in this size range.
The variable of past wins is constructed as the ratio of the past number of wins to the past
number of bids at the timing of bidding. This variable captures two aspects of the bidder￿ s charac-
teristics: di⁄erence in e¢ ciency and di⁄erence in skill across bidders. The ￿rst aspect indicates that
bidders with more past wins submit lower bids, while in contrast, the second aspect indicates that
bidders with more wins submit higher bids because they are capable of undertaking more di¢ cult
tasks that other bidders cannot perform. The sign of the estimated coe¢ cient would indicate which
aspect of the variable is more relevant to our data.
Sales characteristics do not di⁄er between the procedures. On an average, the construction size
is less than 50 million JPY, and the average length of the contract is more than ￿ve months. The
major type of public works is road construction, followed by river works and port construction
works. One interesting question from the econometrics viewpoint is the possible endogeneity of
the project size. This concern arises when procuring o¢ cials are indeed corrupt. Note that the
discretionary practice applies only to small-scale projects. Hence, to maximize the opportunities
of receiving bribes, the o¢ cials would have an incentive to split a large project into pieces, so
that each piece is classi￿ed as a small-scale project. Indeed, Mauro (1998) ￿nds evidence that
corruption distorts government spending toward the items prone to bribery. We discuss this issue
of endogeneity in the next section.
While the average value of bidders and sales characteristics are similar between the two prac-
tices, clear di⁄erences emerge in the auction outcomes. The average bid and the winning bid, both
normalized by the ceiling price, are respectively three and four percent higher under the discre-
tionary procedures than under the rule-based procedures. The Her￿ndahl index is measured by
each bidder￿ s fraction of the sum of public works won (in values) during the study period. The
index indicates that the auctions under the discretionary procedure are twice as concentrated as
those under the rule-based one, suggesting that the former procedure substantially restricts the
number of bidders.
In order to examine whether contractors under the transparent procedure bid more aggressively
than those under the opaque procedure, we compare the distributions of bids between the two
procedures. Figure 2 presents the cumulative distribution of the winning bids. The ￿gure indicates
that low bids are likely to be submitted under the transparent procedure than under the opaque
one. The relation of the ￿rst-order stochastic dominance essentially persists for the entire range of
values. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the hypothesis that the two distributions are equal
with a D statistic of 0.587.
Although the direct comparison of the winning bid distributions is informative, it may not be
9very meaningful. We have not yet controlled for the di⁄erences in the type of works and bidders, and
the number of competitors. The concerns for the heterogeneity across projects and bidders, along
with endogeneity in the competition e⁄ect could explain the observed di⁄erence in the distribution
of the cumulative bids. The next section considers such econometric issues and measures the extent
to which improved transparency a⁄ects bidding outcomes. 15
3 Analysis of the Bidding Behavior
3.1 Estimation Model and Identi￿cation
This section examines the e⁄ect of improved transparency in procurement auctions on the bidding
behavior. Based on the analysis of the bidding behavior, the section also estimates the extent to
which the government decreases its procurement expenditure by the introduction of transparent
practices.
There are two ways through which bidding behavior can be analyzed. First, we could develop
a structural representation of an equilibrium bidding function by making speci￿c assumptions that
allow for the possibility of collusion and corruption. Alternatively, we could forego identi￿cation of
structural parameters and approximate a bidding function as a reduced-form expression of exoge-
nous auction and bidder characteristics that are observed among bidders and procuring o¢ cials.
In principle, the ￿rst approach allows identi￿cation of the parameters of the bidding function and
provides a complete description of the bidding behavior. Its main disadvantage is that restrictive
parameterization is required in order to describe the supplier￿ s bidding patterns. This problem is
particularly grave in our application because we lack detailed knowledge regarding the structure of
the market in which more than 300 bidders participated. Based on the description of the procure-
ment market in the previous section, we suspect that the market can be collusive. As Porter and
Zona (1993) argue, it is di¢ cult to build a structural model of conspiratory behavior without a de-
tailed account of the operation and bidding practice of collusion. Thus, we pursue the reduced-form
approach in this paper to assess the role of improved procurement practice in bidding patterns.
We employ the technique used by Porter and Zona (1993) and Bajari and Ye (2003) that
proposes methods to detect collusion from an independent private values model. The basic structure
of the estimation model for bidder i, project c, and year t, is as follows:
yi;c;t = ￿ ￿ Transparencyc;t + Nc;t￿ + Xi;c;t￿ + "i;c;t: (1)
15An easy solution is to regress bids on contract-, year-, and bidder-speci￿c dummy variables. The obtained
residuals can be regarded as idiosyncratic variations in bids. We split the residuals into two subsets corresponding
to each of the two procurement procedure regimes. The cumulative distributions of the residuals, not shown in the
paper, possess qualitatively similar features to those presented in Figure 2.
10The dependent variable, yi;c;t, is the logarithm of either a bid or a winning bid, normalized
by the corresponding government￿ s estimated contract price of the project.16 As discussed in the
previous section, the government rejects bids that exceed the estimate. Thus, the valid normalized
bid must lie between zero and one. We use this dependent variable, because our preliminary analysis
found that the coe¢ cient of the contract-price estimate is economically and statistically equal to
one when the logarithm of the bid is used as the dependent variable, and the logarithm of the
corresponding government￿ s estimated contract price is used as an explanatory variable, using the
same set of other explanatory variables in (1). Since the dependent variable is normalized, the use
of either the nominal or de￿ ated bids does not a⁄ect our resulting estimates. The dummy variable,
Transparencyc;t, is equal to one when project c is procured under the transparent procedure at
time t, and zero when the project is under discretionary procedure. The number of actual bidders
in the logarithm is denoted by Nc;t. This variable is designed to capture the e⁄ect of competition
on the bids level. In the presence of collusion, we certainly do not expect this variable to a⁄ect
the logarithm of bids. The other bidders and the auction characteristics described in Table 1 are
included in Xi;c;t. The variables included in Xi;c;t are considered to be cost variables and are often
used in the estimation of the independent private values model, such as in the case of Porter and
Zona (1993; 1999), Pesendorfer (2000), and Lee (1999). All continuous variables are expressed in
logarithms. In order to account for the possible nonlinearity in the bidder￿ s cost determinants, we
include squared terms of the distance and utilization-rate variables. We include a set of dummy
variables to control for the types of constructions along with a set of year- and district-speci￿c
dummies. We also include supplier-speci￿c dummies in some speci￿cations mentioned below. 17
The Transparency variable is included in (1) only in the intercept. The e⁄ect of the improved
transparency on bids has to be measured by both this direct e⁄ect (i.e., the Transparency dummy)
and indirect e⁄ects (i.e., through the number of bidders and attributes of participating bidders).
Therefore, in the preliminary analysis, we also interacted the Transparency variable with the
bidder￿ s covariates and the number of bidders. We, however, found that most interacted covariates
are found not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero.18 Thus, we drop the interaction terms in our base
speci￿cation, and only focus on the direct e⁄ect of the improved transparency policy.
Apart from the sets of variables described in (1), important determinants of bids include the bid-
der￿ s unobserved e¢ ciency and the project￿ s unobserved attributes. Such unmeasured determinants
16Alternatively, one can use the simple ratio of a bid (or winning bid) to the estimated contract price. Since no
theory guides us on which speci￿cation should be used, we use the logarithmic form on the basis of better ￿t to the
data, in the same way as Lee (1999) and Pesendorfer (2000) do.
17Unless mentioned otherwise, we do not include project-speci￿c dummy variables because they perfectly explain
the Transparency variable.
18The variables that are statistically signi￿cant are the bidder￿ s rating and past wins. However, this estimation
result does not qualitatively in￿ uence our results in any signi￿cant way.
11are represented by "i;c;t. The presence of this term creates two problems related to endogeneity ￿
endogeneity in project size and in the bidder￿ s participation.
Endogeneity in project size arises when procuring o¢ cials are indeed corrupt. Note that the
discretionary practice applies to a small-scale project that is worth a maximum of 70 million JPY.
Hence, in maximizing the opportunity of receiving bribes, the o¢ cials have an incentive to divide
a large project into small pieces in order to ensure that each piece is classi￿ed as a small project.
Indeed, the study by Mauro (1998), involving a cross section of countries, ￿nds evidence that
corruption distorts government expenditure toward the items prone to bribery. The distortion in
the size composition of projects would create ine¢ ciency because it is usually optimal to order a
large-scale project rather than to divide it into small pieces. Thus, other conditions being equal,
the bids are likely to be higher under the discretionary practice. The concern for this distortion
creates a downward bias in the estimate of ￿.
In order to check whether this concern is acute in our application, we examine the distribution
of project sizes for all the contracts auctioned by the Mie government during the study period, as
shown in Figure 3. The project size is measured in terms of the government￿ s estimated contract
price. We anticipate that, in the presence of corruption, the number of small projects would be
greater under the discretionary practice. However, the distribution of project sizes is the same
before and after June 2002 when transparent practices were introduced. In fact, the proportion of
the number of small projects to the total number of contracts increased from 72 to 76 percent. This
observation contradicts the inference drawn from the ￿ndings of Mauro (1998). We conclude that
the endogeneity in the transparency variable is not severe, and thus treat this variable as exogenous
in the estimation of (1). However, note that the exogeneity assumption of the transparency dummy
does not necessarily indicate the absence of corruption. This is because the o¢ cials in charge of
qualifying bidders often di⁄er from those in charge of allocating project sizes. It is plausible that
the ￿rst group of o¢ cials ￿nds it prudent not to work with the second group due to the increasing
risk of being caught. However, the ￿rst group can have a smooth relationship with suppliers over
a given set of small projects.
The concern of endogenous bidders￿participation arises in the absence of collusion. Endogene-
ity emerges under both discretionary and transparent practices. Under the former practice, the
government restricts the participation of bidders at its own command. The number of bidders is
generally restricted to less than sixteen bidders. The endogeneity in participation arises if the gov-
ernment selects bidders based on the bidder￿ s valuations and signals, instead of random assignment.
Endogeneity is also a concern under transparent practices. Since the government uses a binding
ceiling price, only bidders with favorable signals are likely to submit bids. While it is often claimed
that the government￿ s estimated contract price (i.e., the ceiling price) is set adequately high to
12ensure that suppliers receive generous pro￿t margins, it is theoretically possible that the actual
bidders in the data are drawn from the truncated distribution of potential bidders.
In empirical implementation, the concern regarding endogenous participation is made apparent
by considering the expectation of (1) over the selected sample:







A￿ + Xi;c;t￿ + E ("i;c;tjdi;c;t);
where the selection indicator, di;c;t equals one when supplier i bids for project c at time t. The
set of potential bidders that bids for letting c at time t is denoted by Ic;t. Thus,
P
j2Ic;t dj;c;t
is equivalent to the number of active bidders, Nc;t. If the selection indicator correlates with the
bidder￿ s unmeasured attributes, the last term of the above mentioned equation is not equal to the
unconditional expectation, E ("i;c;t), and thus correlates with the number-of-bidders variable. We
assume that the latent variable that determines the participation decision is normally distributed
with the bidding function error. We use the Heckit procedure to control for the self-selection bias
in the estimation 19.
The validity of the selection-control model relies on the assumption of the normal distribution.
A misspeci￿ed selection rule generates biased estimates. We expect that the misspeci￿cation most
signi￿cantly in￿ uences the estimate of the coe¢ cient in Nc;t because this variable and the conditional
expectation of "i;c;t both contain a vector of selection indicators, di;c;t. In order to protect against
the possibility of the selection model being misspeci￿ed, we supplement the Heckit model with the
instrumental variable (IV) method to control the number-of-bidders variable. The IV method helps
us assess the robustness of our estimates to the Heckit selection model.
The above discussion is based on the speci￿cation in (1). It is possible that a misspeci￿ed
functional form of (1) leads to a biased estimate of ￿. In order to check the robustness of our
results with regard to this functional form, we employ a method of matching the estimator to
assess the e⁄ect of the improved transparency. In its traditional form, a matching estimator pairs
each treated unit with an observationally similar control, thereby adjusting for the di⁄erence in the
distribution of covariates. The calculated di⁄erence is interpreted as the e⁄ect of the policy (i.e.,
the improved transparency). In our application, however, due to a large number of explanatory
and ￿xed-e⁄ect dummy variables, it is di¢ cult to implement this straightforward matching method.
Provided that the conditional treatment probability can be estimated using a parametric method,
such as a probit model, the dimensionality of the matching problem is reduced to matching on the
uni-variate propensity score. Let Pi = Pr(Transparency = 1jXi;Ni) for simplicity (here we omit
the subscripts c and t). A propensity matching is expressed as:
19In our empirical implementation discussed below, we consider the possibility that the selection rule di⁄ers de-
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i are supplier i￿ s bids under the respective treatment (i.e., transparency) and
control (i.e., discretionary) practices, where the sets of suppliers corresponding to the respective
practices are I1 and I0. The region of common support is denoted by S, and the number of
suppliers in the set I1\S by n. This method allows us to match solely on the basis of the predicted
probability of selection into the treatment, instead of conditioning on a large number of variables
included in (1). Thus, the propensity-score matching provides a practical method to break the
curse of dimensionality for matching. In general, the match for each treated suppliers i 2 I1 \ S
is constructed as a weighted average over the outcomes of control suppliers, where the weights
W (i;j) depend on the distance between Pi and Pj. De￿ne a neighborhood C (Pi) for each supplier
i in the treated sample. The controls matched to i are those in the set Ai =
￿
j 2 I0jPj 2 C (Pi)
￿
.
Matching estimators di⁄er in the way in which the neighborhood is de￿ned and the weights W (i;j)
are constructed. In this paper, we employ the simple nearest-neighbor matching:
C (Pi) = min
j
kPi ￿ Pjk
where j 2 I0. The control supplier with the value of Pj closest to Pi is selected as the match. We
use several nearest neighbors and use their average as counterfactual outcomes in the next section.
We have thus far described the estimation methods to measure the average e⁄ect of improved
transparency on the bids and the winning bids. The estimated average e⁄ects would not necessarily
inform us of the changes in the distribution of bids caused by the introduction of transparent
procurement practices. In order to analyze the e⁄ects on the distribution in bids, we estimate the
quantile regression model of (1). We restrict the estimation to ￿ve quantiles of 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75,
and 0.9. This estimation model would allow us to assess the magnitude of the e⁄ect according to
the quantiles of the distribution of bids while controlling for other factors that contribute to the
variability of bids.
3.2 Estimation Results
This section reports the estimation results of the e⁄ect of improved transparency on the bidding
behavior. We present the estimation results indicating that improved transparency in procurement
14auctions lowers the levels of both the bids and the winning bids. This result is robust to concerns
related to endogeneity and sample-selection and distributional assumptions. A strong e⁄ect is
observed at the upper quantiles of the distribution of bids and winning bids. In this section, we
￿nd that the estimated impact of the improved transparency is approximately three percent on
the winning bids or equivalent to an annual cost saving of only 50 million JPY. An analysis of
residuals obtained from the bids regression implies that collusion existed but weakened when the
quali￿cation procedure became transparent.
Tables 2 and 3 show the regression estimates of the bids and the winning bids respectively.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are used in the tables. With regard to all the speci￿ca-
tions in Table 2, the Wald tests reject the hypothesis that all the estimates are zero. The data
￿t well for the models with supplier-speci￿c components in the bids regressions. Although most
coe¢ cients are not precisely estimated, result (A) indicates that the bidders under transparent
practices bid more aggressively than those under discretionary practices. This result could be in-
￿ uenced by unmeasured bidder characteristics. Thus, we estimate the model with supplier-speci￿c
dummy variables and report the results under (B). The e⁄ect of improved transparency remains
signi￿cant at ￿0:03. The distance between the construction site and the bidder￿ s location appears
to increase the supplier￿ s bids level. This ￿nding is also consistent with that of other studies on
procurement auction, such as the studies by Porter and Zona (1999) and Bajari and Ye (2003). The
past-wins variable also positively correlates with the bids. This result may imply the importance
of the supplier￿ s skill in bidding patterns; more experienced suppliers tend to procure more di¢ cult
tasks than do inexperienced suppliers, and thus they are capable of charging skill premiums on bids.
This ￿nding is in contrast with that of De Silva, Dunne, and Kosmopoulou (2003), which suggests
that the bids decrease with the past wins and associates this result with e¢ ciency di⁄erences across
bidders. Our ￿nding regarding the estimates of past wins indicates that the e⁄ect of skill di⁄erences
dominates that of e¢ ciency di⁄erences in our bidding data.
Results (A) and (B) are based on the assumption that variation in the bidder￿ s participation
is exogenous, and both suggest that the number of active bidders has no statistical in￿ uence on
the normalized bids. However, it is possible that active bidders are selected on the basis of their
unmeasured attributes. The participation decision of bidders could be endogenous in case there
exists a persistent relationship between the bidder￿ s unmeasured attributes and the participation
decision. This concern would invalidate the assumption of the OLS method used in our previous
analyses. We use the Heckit correction procedure for the sample selection in speci￿cations (C) and
(D). As we discussed in Section 2.2, we are aware of the identity and characteristics of potential
bidders. We estimate the probit and describe the entry decision of potential bidders. The set of
covariates include the estimated contract price of the project, the minimum price, the distance
15between the project site and the bidder￿ s location, and the contract period, along with dummy
variables speci￿c to project types and geographical districts.20 Since it is plausible that the selection
procedure di⁄ers between the discretionary and transparent practices, we also estimated the probit
and construct the Heckit term for the respective practices. Since the estimated coe¢ cients of
the Heckit terms were not statistically di⁄erent, we restrict the coe¢ cients to be the same, and
report the estimation results under (C) and (D). With the inclusion of these variables and under
the assumption of normality, the bidding function estimates will be consistent even if the bidder￿ s
participation is endogenous. We ￿nd that the coe¢ cients of Nc;t remain insigni￿cant in both the
speci￿cations, and the estimated coe¢ cients of other variables are close to those under (A) and
(B).
In order to check the robustness of the aforementioned results to the Heckit-selection-model
assumption, we apply the instrumental variable on the speci￿cations of (C) and (D) to directly
control the number of bidders. In the ￿rst-stage regression, we regress the number of bidders in an
auction on various covariates with a Poisson speci￿cation. Our regression speci￿cation includes the
estimated contract price, minimum price, contract period, and dummy variables speci￿c to project
types, districts, and suppliers. The estimated number of bidders from this ￿rst-stage regression is
used as an instrument for the number-of-bidders variable in (E) and (F). The results under (E) and
(F) indicate that self selection on the error term is not very severe. The magnitude of di⁄erences
in the estimated elasticities between the pair of (C) and (E), and that of (D) and (F), are not
signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero.
Table 3 shows the winning-bids estimates. The supplier-￿xed e⁄ect cannot be included in this
regression because according to our data, merely 30 percent of the suppliers won the auctions more
than once. The e⁄ect of improved transparency on the winning bids ceased to be signi￿cant for
all speci￿cations, in contrast to those in Table 2. The result of this insigni￿cant average e⁄ect
leads us to conduct quantile regressions later in this section and examine the policy e⁄ect on the
distribution of winning bids. While the distance variable is now insigni￿cant, the utilization-rate
variable becomes signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. At the average utilization rate of 10 percent,
the winning bids increase at a decreasing rate as the job backlog increases. The winning bids are
highest at a utilization rate of approximately 25 percent. At this rate, the bids are approximately
5 percent higher than those at the utilization rate of zero. The coe¢ cient of the number of bidders
becomes statistically signi￿cant but economically insigni￿cant. For example, result (E) indicates
that adding one bidder to the average bid letting would decrease the proportion of winning bids by
merely a tenth of one percent.
Tables 4 and 5 present the quantile regression estimates for the bids and the winning bids,
20The minimum price is explained in footnote 8.
16respectively. Five quantile regression results are reported in each table. The quantile regression
helps us to analyze the changes in the distributions of the bids caused by the introduction of
transparent procurement practices. Thus, the estimated policy e⁄ects reported in this paper are
more detailed as compared to the results regarding the average e⁄ects. We use the same speci￿cation
as (A) in the quantile regression. Due to the complex computation, the standard errors reported
in the tables are unadjusted by heteroskedasticity.
At all the levels of quantiles reported in Table 4, the improved transparency reduces the bids
by three percent. The ￿rm￿ s bids increase at a decreasing rate with an increase in the distance to
the construction site. The bidder ratings decrease the logarithm of bids at the 25th percentile and
beyond. The variable may serve as a proxy for the bidder￿ s production e¢ ciency. The number of
bidders also decreases the bids level but at an economically insigni￿cant level. The utilization rate
is estimated to be negative on the 0.9 quantile but at a marginal signi￿cance level.
It is interesting to note that the model ￿t improves toward the upper quantiles of the dis-
tribution. The number of coe¢ cients at the 95 percent signi￿cance level increases beyond the
50th percentile. A similar observation applies to the winning-bids regressions reported in Table 5.
The e⁄ect of improved transparency signi￿cantly lowers the logarithm of the winning bids by two
percent at the 0.5 quantiles and above. These quantile regressions show that the introduction of
transparency lowers the winning bids by two percent at the upper quantiles of the bids distribution.
Note that the policy e⁄ect averaged over the winning-bids distribution is not signi￿cantly estimated
in Table 3. As the utilization rate increases, the winning bids initially increase and then decrease
from the 0.25 quantile regression results. The winning bids are highest at the utilization rate of
17 percent. The number of bidders negatively correlates with the bids at the 0.25 quantiles and
above. Other bidders￿own characteristics are no longer statistically signi￿cant in these quantile
regressions.
Table 6 summarizes the estimates of the transparency dummy mentioned above. The upper
block of the table presents the average e⁄ect obtained from the results of the OLS, IV, and matching
estimators. The bottom block presents the e⁄ect on the distributions of the bids obtained from
the quantile regression results. For each block, the estimated e⁄ect on bids is presented in the ￿rst
row, followed by the e⁄ect on the winning bids.
We have already discussed the OLS and IV estimates. In order to construct matching estimators
(columns G and H), we ￿rst estimate, using probit, the probability of selection into the transparency
regime with the same set of explanatory variables used in (A) and (B). We then compare the
outcome (either the bids or the winning bids) of each auction c with the average outcome of the
matched auction. Finally, we estimate the average e⁄ect of the improved transparency as the
17average of these comparisons. We employ four matches to construct the estimators. 21 The robust
standard errors proposed in Abadie, Drucker, Herr, and Imbens (2001) are used for (G) and (H).
All the estimates of the average e⁄ect of the improved transparency on the bids are at the similar
level of approximately ￿2:9 percent. The e⁄ects on the winning bids present mixed results: the
e⁄ects obtained from the mean regressions are insigni￿cant, whereas those based on the matching
estimators are signi￿cant at the ￿2:3 percent level. A concern in the application of the mean
regressions to the winning bids is that the bidder covariates associated with discretionary and
transparent practices are considerably di⁄erent, especially for the following three variables: distance
to the construction sites (0.02 and 0.04), past wins (0.08 and 0.15), and the number of bidders
(8.9 and 15.8). The ￿rst (second) number in the parentheses indicates the mean value of each
variable under the discretionary (transparent) practice. In order to assess the impact of improved
transparency from the mean regression, we have to rely on the functional form (1) to extrapolate
the explanatory covariates. The matching estimator alleviates our reliance on the functional form
by selecting subsamples using intermediate propensity scores. Thus, we prefer the results from the
matching estimators for the measurement of the average policy e⁄ect on the winning bids. The
concern of extrapolation is not very severe in the bid regressions because the covariates at the mean
are similar between the two practices.
The estimated policy e⁄ects are observed more signi￿cantly on the upper quantiles of the bid
distributions. The magnitudes of the e⁄ects on the bids di⁄er by 20 percent when we compare the
estimates at the 0.5 quantiles with those at the 0.9 quantile. The e⁄ect on the winning bids is
signi￿cant only at the upper quantiles of the distribution. If the number of bidders is su¢ cient to
control for the competition e⁄ect, the quantile regression results indicate the existence of a non-
competitive market structure under discretionary practices. The negative coe¢ cient on the policy
variable suggests two competing hypotheses with regard to the policy e⁄ects: ￿rst, the introduction
of transparent practices resolved the collusion, and second, it did not resolve but instead weakened
the collusion. The latter hypothesis is not implausible because the exclusive territories system is
in place, and the enforcement of the Fair Trade Commission has been weak in Japan. Either of the
hypotheses predicts that the improved transparency has a larger impact on the upper quantiles of
the distribution of the bids.
In an attempt to draw inferences on the market competitiveness in our study, we test for
statistical independence in residuals obtained from the bids regression. Porter and Zona (1993;
1999) develop and Bajari and Ye (2003) elaborate an approach to test for collusion in procurement
auctions based on the reduced-form bids function. We calculate the correlation coe¢ cient for
a pair of large suppliers and test for statistical independence of the pair of residuals by using
21We use the Stata program (match.ado) documented by Abadie, Drucker, Herr, and Imbens (2001).
18the Fisher statistics. Under the null hypothesis on independent action, the information on the
bids of a particular supplier should not help in predicting the bids of the other supplier. Under
the alternative hypothesis of collusive action, knowledge that one cartel member bids above the
predicted level helps predict whether other members will bid above that level. If one cartel member
o⁄ers a high bid, then the other cartel members also tend to o⁄er high bids. We focus on 30 large
suppliers in terms of the number of submitted bids, and calculate the correlation coe¢ cients of
all the pairs of the thirty suppliers. We obtain residuals from the model (1) with year-, district-
, supplier-, and project-speci￿c components. We add project-speci￿c dummy variables in this
case because unmeasured project heterogeneity might generate a correlation between the residuals.
While this speci￿cation is unsuitable when the transparent dummy estimate is emphasized, the
inclusion of the project-￿xed e⁄ects will help us control for the project characteristics unobservable
to the econometrician. Note that we are able to calculate a correlation coe¢ cient for the pair
of suppliers who submit simultaneous bids on more than two occasions. The average pairwise
correlation coe¢ cients substantially di⁄er depending on the procurement practice: it takes 0.75
under the discretionary practice, but 0.35 under the transparent practice. The Fisher statistics
of the discretionary and transparent practices are 15.41 (20.36) and 21.54 (23.44), respectively,
with the average number of observations within parentheses. This result indicates that the average
pairwise correlation coe¢ cients are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero as well as from each other. We
also expand the number of suppliers to 50, but the results are qualitatively similar to those with
the smaller sample.
The test results of statistical independence in the residuals from the bid function are suggestive,
albeit not conclusive, evidence for the presence of collusion and against the presence of competition.
The ring would have bribed the procuring o¢ cials with pecuniary incentives or revolving doors,
and used the discretionary quali￿cation process as a device to punish deviators. Since suppliers
cannot participate in the bidding process without being quali￿ed by the government, this device
could e⁄ectively facilitate collusion. Thus, the ring would have been able to maintain high win-
ning bids without inviting deviation. When the government ceased the discretionary practice and
replaced it with transparent and rule-based practices, the collusive mechanism became weaker in
the absence of the o¢ cials￿discretion. However, the absence of the o¢ cial￿ s discretion would not
have eliminated the Dango practice under the protection o⁄ered by exclusive territories preserved
by the Mie government.
4 Conclusion
E¢ ciency in government procurement is an important issue in cases where public procurement
accounts for a large portion of economic activity. Government procurement ranges from eight to
19ten percent of the gross domestic product of major OECD countries, and this share is even larger
in developing countries. 22 Ensuring transparency in the procurement procedure is an essential
determinant of e¢ ciency, as it enhances the competitiveness of public procurement. Opaque and
discretionary procurement practices typically reduce incentives for ￿rms to enter the market, and
often engender the relationship between government o¢ cials and contractors. This can result in a
substantial loss in the government￿ s budget as the government has to pay an excessive amount and
award contracts to undeserving suppliers.
This paper conducted an analysis based on a unique experience from the Mie government in
Japan where discretionary practices were replaced by transparent practices in the quali￿cation
procedure. Under the discretionary practice, the Mie government used their discretion to decide
on which the suppliers were quali￿ed for the bid letting. This discretionary practice was often
viewed as an opportunity for breeding corruption, supported by Japan￿ s considerable history of bid
rigging in the award of public-works contracts (see McMillan, 1991; Woodall, 1996, for details).
Indeed, Japan exhibited a poor performance in terms of the control-of-corruption indicator, as
estimated by Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005). Among the twenty-four OECD countries,
Japan is steadily descending in the anticorruption ranking; it slipped from 18th in 1996 to 20th
in 2004. The introduction of rule-based and transparent practices in the quali￿cation of bidders is
expected to substantially weaken the smooth relationship between the o¢ cials and the suppliers.
However, the estimated e⁄ect of improved transparency on the government expenditure is small.
The reduction of the government￿ s expenditure on procurement is estimated as merely two percent
or an annual amount of 50 million JPY. This result is robust to concerns of endogeneity and sample
selection, and distributional assumptions. The test of statistical independence on the residuals
from the bids regression indicates the occurrence of collusion in our sample period. The collusion
weakened but remained after the introduction of transparent practices. The ￿ndings of a marginal
cost saving on the government procurement help us understand a reason for slow proliferation of
transparency in public procurement practices. The paper￿ s results indicate that the introduction
of transparent practice is insu¢ cient to warrant competitive public procurement. In order to enjoy
maximum bene￿ts from the reform toward transparency, countries simultaneously combat suppliers￿
conspiratory practices in the public procurement tendering system.
22The average government expenditure of OECD countries is approximately 20 percent of their GDP. This ￿gure
is calculated such that the government procurement meets the standard of the WTO Government Procurement
Agreement. For further details, see Trionfetti, 2000.
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22Year of Sale
Number of Bids 945 1622
Number of Auctions 220 177
Number of Bidders 235 279
Bidder Characteristics
Distance 0.05 0.08 -0.03
(0.047) (0.065) (0.005)
Utilization Rate 0.12 0.10 0.02
(0.229) (0.206) (0.019)
Bidders Rating 887.20 898.52 -11.32
(99.852) (112.00) (9.348)
Past Wins 0.14 0.11 0.03
(0.238) (0.107) (0.017)
Auction Characteristics
Avg Constr Size (in million yen) 49.60 46.90 2.70
(16.40) (17.40) (2.349)
Contract Length (in days) 153.89 159.53 -5.64
(72.12) (111.48) (12.99)
Type of Construction works
% River works 0.18 0.11 0.07
% Port constr. Works 0.14 0.22 -0.08
% Road constr.  0.46 0.37 0.09
% Bridge constr. Works 0.04 0.06 -0.02
% Sewage works 0.02 0.05 -0.03
% Anti-erosion works 0.15 0.16 -0.01
Auction outcomes
Number of Participating bidders 8.91 15.77 -6.86
(0.511) (6.62) (0.645)
Normalized winning bids 0.91 0.87 0.04
(0.078) (0.104) (0.012)
Normalized bids 0.95 0.91 0.03
(0.051) (0.068) (0.002)
Herfindahl Index 0.06 0.03 0.04
(0.107) (0.056) (0.012)
The table presents mean value of each variable, with the standard error inside parenthesis.
The public-works projects described in this table are worth 70 million JY or less per project.
Distance is calculated using the formulae discussed in footnote 11.
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(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Distance -0.08 0.22 
a -0.08 0.23 
a -0.06 0.22 
a
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08)
Squared Distance 0.12 -0.75 
a 0.12 -0.78
 a 0.02 -0.74
 a
(0.17) (0.28) (0.17) (0.28) (0.14) (0.28)
Utilization Rate 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Squared Utilization Rate -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Bidders Rating -0.01 0.21 
c -0.01 0.21 
c -0.01 0.21 
c
(0.01) (0.12) (0.01) (0.12) (0.01) (0.12)
Past Wins -0.02 0.04
 b -0.02 0.04
 b -0.02 0.04 
b
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Number of Bidders 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
c -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Contract Length 1.11 
a 0.59
 a 1.11




(0.31) (0.20) (0.31) (0.20) (0.34) (0.22)
Selection Control  - - 0.18 -1.66 0.29 -1.29
(1.12) (1.27) (1.09) (1.21)
Constant -0.05 0.03 -0.05 -1.64 
c 0.03 -1.60 
c
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.89) (0.06) (0.88)
F Statistics




 a 12.75 
a 6.59 
a




 a 8.70 
a 2.51 
a





 a 7.58 
a
Suppliers Fixed Effects  - 6.12 
a - 6.13 
a - 6.13 
a
R-squared 0.07 0.52 0.07 0.52 0.07 0.52
Number of obs 2542 2542 2542 2542 2542 2542
A heteroskedasticity-robust standard error is in parenthesis.
For expositional purpose, the coefficient of Contract Length is multiplied by 10000, and that of Selection Control is multiplied by 100.
Subscripts a, b, c indicate the 99-, 95-, and 90-percent significance levels.
Regression Results on Bids
TABLE 2( A ) ( C ) ( E )
OLS Selection IV + Selection
Tranparency Dummy -0.02 -0.02 0.09
(0.02) (0.02) (0.06)
Distance -0.77 -0.69 -0.53
(0.69) (-0.73) (0.64)
Squared Distance -0.23 -0.51 -1.92
(2.74) (2.83) (2.89)





Squared Utilization Rate -0.84




Bidders Rating 0.01 0.00 -0.02
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Past Wins -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)










Selection Control  - -0.07 -0.05
(0.08) (0.08)
Constant -0.07 0.06 0.53
(0.67) (0.69) (0.74)
F Statistics
All Explanatory Variables 1.76
 a 1.84 
a 1.57 
a
Districts Fixed Effects 1.81 1.16 1.15
Work-Types Fixed Effects  1.25 1.64 1.18
R-squared 0.14 0.17 0.18
Number of obs 242 242 242
A heteroskedasticity-robust standard error is in parenthesis.
For expositional purpose, the coefficient of Contract Lengths is multiplied by 10000,
and that of Selection Control is multiplied by 100
Subscripts a, b, c indicate the 99-, 95-, and 90-percent significance levels.
TABLE 3
Regression Results on Winning BidsQuantiles 0.1 0.25 Median 0.75 0.9




 a -0.03 
a
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Distance 0.21 
a 0.16




(0.042) (0.024) (0.015) (0.012) (0.014)
Squared Distance -0.37





(0.137) (0.078) (0.056) (0.028) (0.033)
Utilization Rate 1.15 0.37 0.15 -0.49 -1.34
 b
(1.600) (0.935) (0.554) (0.493) (0.603)
Squared Utilization Rate -0.48 -0.30 -0.34 0.31 0.96
(1.986) (1.196) (0.709) (0.628) (0.732)
Bidder's Rating -1.05 




(0.527) (0.521) (0.267) (0.182) (0.206)
Past Wins -0.79 -0.36 -0.28 -0.01 0.95
 a
(0.889) (0.540) (0.310) (0.269) (0.324)




 a -0.76 
a
(0.395) (0.252) (0.150) (0.137) (0.181)
Contract Length 0.16 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.12 
a
(0.197) (0.086) (0.046) (0.035) (0.033)
Constant -2.99 -3.08 2.07 4.86 
a 6.09 
a
(3.633) (3.560) (1.866) (1.323) (1.571)
F Statistics






Districts Fixed Effects 37.36 
a 1.24 1.07 0.79 1.55






R-squared 0.04 0.08 0.13 0.21 0.27
Number of obs 2567 2567 2567 2567 2567
A heteroskedasticity-robust standard error is in parenthesis.
For expositional purpose, the coefficients of Utilization Rate, Squared Utilization Rate, Bidders Rating, Past Wins, Number of Bidders are 
multiplied by 100, and the coefficient of Contract Length is multiplied by 10000.
Subscripts a, b indicate the 99- and 95-percent confidence levels.
Quantile Regressions for Bids
TABLE 4Quantiles 0.1 0.25 Median 0.75 0.9




(0.181) (0.013) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Distance -0.59 0.02 -0.05 -0.09 0.05
(4.074) (0.316) (0.081) (0.136) (0.161)
Squared Distance -4.10 -2.02 
c -0.03 0.09 -0.27
(13.614) (1.191) (0.279) (0.497) (0.558)
Utilization Rate 0.57 0.24 
c 0.02 0.01 0.02
(1.598) (0.140) (0.036) (0.047) (0.059)
Squared Utilization Rate -1.01 -0.69 
b -0.07 -0.04 -0.08
(2.997) (0.280) (0.069) (0.079) (0.101)
Bidders Rating -0.38 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01
(1.044) (0.074) (0.018) (0.026) (0.028)
Past Wins 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.405) (0.048) (0.011) (0.015) (0.017)





(0.256) (0.020) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010)
Contract Length 5.22 2.01 
c 0.49 
c -0.02 0.14
(19.656) (1.173) (0.264) (0.412) (0.467)
Constant 2.70 0.08 -0.09 -0.08 0.05
(7.106) (0.509) (0.125) (0.178) (0.195)
F Statistics (degree of Freedom)





Districts Fixed Effects 0.02 0.22 0.44 0.03 0.45
Work-Types Fixed Effects  0.07 1.19 3.71 
a 0.75 0.80
R-squared 0.21 0.10 0.14 0.14 0.14
Number of obs 242 242 242 242 242
A heteroskedasticity-robust standard error is in parenthesis.
For expositional purpose, the coefficient is multiplied by 100 on Contract Length.
Subscripts a, b, c indicate the 99-, 95-, and 90-percent significance levels.
Quantile Regressions for Winning Bids
TABLE 5OLS / IV / Matching Estimates
ABCDEFGH
Estimation Method OLS OLS Selection Selection Matching Matching
Supplier-Fixed Effects NYNYNYNY
Effect on Bids -0.045 
a -0.031 
a -0.042
 a -0.026 
a -0.024
 a -0.023
 b -0.033 
a -0.029 
a
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) ('0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007)
Effect on Winning Bids -0.018 - -0.022 - 0.086 - -0.023 
b -
(0.024) - (0.020) - (0.061) - (0.011) -
Quantile Regression Estimates
Quantiles 0.1 0.25 Median 0.75 0.9




 a -0.034 
a
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Effect on Winning Bids 0.010 -0.018 -0.022
 a -0.019 
a -0.018 
a
(0.181) (0.013) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Specifications used in Quantile regression are based on (A).






Estimated Effects of Improved Transparency on Bids and Winning BidsFIGURE 1
Geographical Supply Concentration and Project SitesNote:
The horizontal axis is defined by winning bid, divided by the corresponding
government's estimated contract price.
FIGURE 2
Cumulative Distribution:
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FIGURE 3